Borderland - Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet by Pogue, Richard W.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 52 Issue 1 
1953 
Borderland - Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet 
Richard W. Pogue 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Intellectual 
Property Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Legislation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard W. Pogue, Borderland - Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1953). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1953] COPYRIGHT .AND DESIGN p ATENT 
BORDERLAND-WHERE COPYRIGHT AND DESIGN 
PATENT MEET* 
Richard W. Poguef 
33 
COPYRIGHT law and design patent law contemplate basically different objects of protection. Yet at the outer fringes of these types of 
protection certain concepts overlap to form a rather undefined border-
land in which it is difficult to say what law is applicable-copyright law, 
patent law, neither, or both. It is the purpose of this paper to explore 
this borderland area in the light of traditional copyright and patent law 
principles, with attention given to policy considerations involved, and 
to offer suggestions toward drawing a sharper boundary between the 
two.1 
The Problem 
At the heart of the difficulty lies the fact that certain works of art 
apparently copyrightable may have application as manufactured articles 
so as to bring them within the language of the design patent sections of 
the Patent Code. Such articles seem to be 'Works of art; models or 
designs for works of art" within the meaning of the Copyright Code,2 
and yet they may also seem to be a "new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture" as referred to in the Patent Code.8 
The best litigated example of the kind of article which seems to fall into 
""This article is a revision of an essay which was awarded the First Prize in the 1953 
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Michigan Law School. It is 
published here through the courtesy of the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers.-Ed. 
t J.D., 1953, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 The same problem has been impossible to resolve on an international level. The 
Berne Copyright Convention leaves the problem to national action; the last paragraph of 
article 2 provides that works of art applied to industry "are protected so far as the domestic 
legislation of each country allows." LAI>As, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY 
AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 247 (1938). 
2 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §5(g). Section 5 provides in major part as follows: "§5. 
Classification of Works for Registration.-The application for registration shall specify to 
which of the following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs: (a) Books, 
including composite and cyclopedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations. 
(b) Periodicals, including newspapers. (c) Lectures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral 
delivery). (d) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions. (e) Musical compositions. 
(f) Maps. (g) Works of art; models or designs for works of art. Ch) Reproductions of a 
work of art. (i) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character. (j) Photo-
graphs. (k) Prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of 
merchandise. (1) Motion-picture photoplays. (m) Motion pictures other than photoplays." 
8 The pertinent section of the Patent Code [66 Stat. L. 805 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. 
(1952 Supp.) §171] reads as follows: "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental 
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions 
and requirements of this title. 
"The provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for 
designs, except as otherwise provided." 
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this twilight zone is the type of artistic statuette, sold as a table-lamp 
base, involved in the series of Stein cases (petition for writ of certiorari 
pending in the Supreme Court at the time of this writing).* Discussion 
of these cases will be presented below; for present purposes suffice it 
to say that the product in suit in the first of the Stein copyright infringe-
ment cases, decided in 1951, was a modem statuette of a Balinese 
dancer for which copyright registration had been obtained. Defendant's 
statuettes were identical with those made by plaintiff. Both parties sold 
them as bases for table lamps. Defendant's contention that the statu-
ettes as lamp bases did not constitute copyrightable subject matter, since 
they were intended to be used for a utilitarian purpose, was upheld, and 
the copyright count of the plaintiff's suit was dismissed.4 
Although most of the controversy has arisen under section S(g) of 
the Copyright Code ("Works of art; models or designs for works of 
art"), the problem also lurks as a latent possibility in connection with 
section S(h) which protects "Reproductions of a work of art," and 
section S(i) which covers "Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or 
technical character."5 As a matter of pure theory, the borderland prob-
lem could occur with respect to an article not falling within any one of 
these specific categories, since the thirteen classifications listed in sec-
tion 5 do n0t limit the subject matter of copyright6 but are simply guides 
for the benefit of the Copyright Office.7 In practice, however, these 
classifications are fairly well determinative of what is copyrightable and 
what is not. As a result, although other possibilities of overlap of copy-
right and design patent coverage exist, the focal point of the problem 
has been the "works of art" classification in section 5. 
The need for decision of whether a particular article which is a 
useful work of art is properly the subject matter of copyright or design 
patent protection may occur in any proceeding in which the validity of 
a copyright or design patent is challenged on the ground of improper 
subject matter. Sometimes the issue is stated to be whether a defend-
ant's copying of the article into a useful form infringes the copyright 
of the work of art. As might be expected, the problem arises generally 
4 Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., (D.C. ill. 1951) 96 F. Supp. 97. 
5 This category was involved in Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost, (7th 
Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 98. 
6 ''The above specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright 
as defined in section 4 of this title, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair 
the copyright protection secured under this title." 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §5. 
7 "Section 5 refers solely to a classification made for the convenience of the copyright 
office and those applying for copyrights." H.Rep. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d sess., 10 (1909), 
reporting out H.R. 28192, which ultimately became the Copyright Act of 1909. See also 
Seltzer v. Sunbrock, (D.C. Cal. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 621. 
* See note 107 infra.-Ed. 
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in suits based on infringement of copyright or design patent,8 or in 
disputes over rulings of the Patent Commissioner.9 Occasionally a court, 
in deciding a case on common law grounds, makes collateral reference 
to the possibility of copyright and/ or design patent protection of a 
·certain article.10 Aside from these procedural channels through which 
the problem may arise, certain conceptual matters may force the issue-
e.g., the fear of double protection and the theory allowing an election 
between the benefits available under the respective statutes.11 
The impo~tance of the problem to manufacturers of artistic creations 
which ornament objects of manufacture is great. They must gamble on 
which type of protection to seek, since their own determination may 
later prove incorrect, on judicial review, and they may prejudice their 
standing if they attempt to follow both paths of protection. Differences 
in design patent and copyright procedure, as well as ultimate scope of 
protection, which will be alluded to below, may cause one or the other 
to dovetail to their industrial needs. In the present hazy state of the law 
applicable to these hybrid articles, designers or their assignees have few 
satisfactory guides in their attempts to anticipate what conduct will 
assure what protection. 
Comparison of Copyright and Design Patent 
Dissimilarities in philosophy, procedure, and protection character-
istic of copyright and design patent make important the problem of 
overlapping legislative grace. While an average businessman perhaps 
considers the two as substantially identical, and while analogies in the 
two fields of law are often interchanged,12 important differences appear 
as a result of Congress' traditional approach in developing two separate 
bodies of law under the one clause in the Constitution.13 A short 
s E.g., the Stein cases, infra p. 52; De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., (C.C. Pa. 
1910) 182 F. 150; Korzybski v. Underwood, (2d Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 727; Jones Bros. 
v. UnderkofHer, (D.C. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 729. And see Columbus Plastic Products, Inc. 
v. Rona Plastic Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1953) ,Ill F. Supp. 623. 
o In re Blood, (D.C. Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 772; Ex parte Cady, 1916 C.D. 57, 62; 
Ex parte Appeal, 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 463 (1952). This issue might be raised in any 
other form of litigation, however, in which validity of a particular patent or copyright is 
attacked-e.g., charges of price fixing. 
10 E.g., some aspect of unfair competition. Wm. A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hock-
ing Glass Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 264. 
11 Although technically inaccurate, the term "election of remedies" is sometimes used 
to refer to this choice of protection. 
12 See exhaustive list of situations where patent law was referred to in copyright cases, 
or vice versa, in Wolff, "Copyright Law and Patent Law: A Comparison," 27 IowA L. Rsv. 
250 (1942). 
13 It has been suggested that one phase of the distinction is implied in the very terms 
"author" and "inventor" as found in the Constitution. "The latter carries an implication 
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examination of the meaningful variances is essential before any solution 
can be attempted. 
A. Theoretical Differences. Although with respect to works of 
art both copyright and design patent protect embodiments of artistic 
appearance, the exact objects of the protection differ. Copyright seeks 
to secure to the author the exclusive right to reproduce, or copy, the 
fruit of his particular intellectual labors;14 this exclusive mantle is 
draped not about his ideas themselves but the literary expression of 
these ideas.15 Patent law, from which the design patent flows, aims 
more directly at development in the particular field of science, and con-
sequently confers a monopoly on the first man concocting a new idea 
and reducing it to physical form. The distinction is plain: two men 
independently making maps of a certain territory, if perfectionists, will 
produce exactly identical maps;16 both may obtain the exclusive right 
to make copies from their own particular map, and yet neither will have 
infringed the other's copyright.17 Patent law, on the other hand, rewards 
the first man to produce the new invention; the second man to the 
Patent Office loses all rights even though he was entirely ignorant of 
the other's efforts. While the copyright claimant is held to know only 
what his actual knowledge tells him,18 the prospective patentee is 
charged with notice of everything which has preceded his invention. 
In return the patentee is granted a complete monopoly as to the appear-
ance of the particular design, while the copyright proprietor can only 
prevent copying.19 Various offspring of this basic difference are mani-
fested in respective procedures, protections, and tests for subject matter 
and infringement. 
B. Procedural Requirements. In some ways the most illuminating 
focal point of the differences be~een the two fields is the procedure 
which excludes the results of ordinary skill, while nothing of this .is necessarily involved 
in the former." Henderson v. Tompkins, (C.C. Mass. 1894) 60 F. 758 at 764. 
14 For discussion of the origin of the term "copyright," as arising out of English printers' 
attempts to justify protection on a property theory after monopolies became unpopular, see 
LmAs, THE !NrE11NATIONAL PROTECTION oF LrrnRARY AND Annsnc PROPERTY 15 (1938). 
15 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
16 This illustration was relied upon by L. Hand, J., in Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1924) 298 F. 145 at 151, quoting BoWKER, COPYRIGHT, !Ts HisTORY AND 
ITs LAw 255 (1912). 
17 A compiler of a directory cannot preclude another person compiling a similar direc-
tory if it is the product of independent work. Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford 
Co., (1st Cir. 1905) 140 F. 539. And see annotation, 26 A.L.R. 585 (1923). 
18 "Anything a perfect ignoramus produces must of necessity be original with him, 
that is, original in the copyright sense." Umbreit, "A Consideration of Copyright," 87 
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 932 at 948 (1939). 
19 This distinction becomes important where there is a likelihood of concurrent inde-
pendent creation of a work. 
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involved in obtaining the particular exclusive right. The copyright 
aspirant's task is by far the easier. 
Copyright administration is handled by the Copyright Office, which 
registers over 200,000 claims each year.20 The method of obtaining 
copyright registration is simple and quick: the author publishes the 
work with a notice of copyright affixed to each copy published, and 
then promptly deposits two copies with the Copyright Office. The 
filing fee is four dollars. The Copyright Office conducts a cursory 
examination directed to the presence or absence of copyrightable subject 
matter, after which the Register of Copyrights issues a certificate of 
registration. No examination as to originality of authorship is under-
taken. 
Patent Office procedure is more difficult, expensive, and prolonged.21 
The inventor must first make application in writing to the Commis-
sioner of Patents, and file in the Patent Office a description of his inven-
tion. He must state under oath that he truly believes himself to be the 
first inventor of the art. The claim then undergoes a thorough exami-
nation by the Commissioner of Patents,22 and if it meets all the require-
ments established by law, the Commissioner issues the patent. Filing 
fees in the case of design patents are ten, fifteen, and thirty dollars, 
depending on the period for which protection is sought. 
Thus patent procedure is much more complicated and time-consum-
ing than comparable copyright practice. The preparation of a patent 
application often requires extensive work by patent attorneys and skilled 
draftsmen, and frequently the application is preceded by a patient search 
of "prior art" which may require additional employees. The legal fees 
and other expenses involved in prosecuting the patent application, 
which may take the better part of a year,23 are generally high. When 
20 This has been true at least during the past five years. AmmAL REPORT OF nm 
REGISTER OF CoPYBIGHTS 8 (1952). In the fiscal year 1952, 4,820 "works of art," 1,040 
"reproductions of works of art," and 1,554 "drawings of plastic works of a scientific or 
technical character" were registered. 
21 In general the same procedures followed in applications for mechanical patents 
apply to design patent applications. For some aspects of procedure having particular relation 
to design patents, see SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 270-301 (1929). 
22 " ••• the examiner shall make a thorough study thereof and shall make a thorough 
investigation of the available prior art relating to the subject matter of the invention sought 
to be patented. The examination shall be complete with respect both to compliance of the 
application with the• statutes and rules and to the patentability of the invention as 
claimed ...• " Rules of Practice, United States Patent Office §l.104(a) (1951). 
23 A period of five months was said to be the usual length of time necessary to obtain 
a design patent in Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents, 71st Cong., 3d sess., 
112 (1930). Cf. 31 CoL. L. REv. 477 at 484 (1931). The period is occasionally shorter. 
"The oldest application at the end of the year had been awaiting examiner action for less 
than five months, a decrease during the year of almost twelve months." AmmAL RE.eoRT 
OF SECRETARY OF CoMMERCE 80 (1951). Cf. 1952 Report (four months). 
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these obstacles24 are contrasted with the four dollar :filing fee and two 
deposits required of copyright registrants, one reason becomes obvious 
as to why producers of ambiguous articles may desire copyright, in 
preference to design patent, protection. 
C. Protection Available. The fundamental difference in protec-
tion has been referred to above-the patentee enjoys the exclusive right 
to prevent others from "making, using, or selling the invention"25 (i.e., 
a complete monopoly), while the copyright registrant enjoys only cer-
tain exclusive rights spelled out in the statute,26 the essence of which is 
the right to make copies of the work. 27 Both statutes permit either the 
inventor, his executors, or administrators to apply for the protection 
sought; both permit an assignee to obtain protection.28 The duration of 
the exclusive rights differs, the copyright owner enjoying a possible 
.fifty-six years of protection and the design patentee being limited at his 
option to three and a half, seven, or fourteen years. 
Criteria established by case law for determining whether there has 
been infringement represent another difference in the effectiveness of 
protection. In Gorham v. White, a Supreme Court case in which 
defendant's silverware resembled closely the design_ used by plaintiff, 
the proposition was established that in design patent cases " ... if, in the 
eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually 
gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such 
as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing 
it to be the other . . . "29 relief will be awarded. That is, "Experts, 
therefore, are not the persons to be deceived."30 Although at :first blush 
the language in copyright opinions to the same effect would seem to 
indicate congruity on this point, it must be remembered that the plain-
tiff in an action for copyright infringement must prove not mere 
similarity, as in the case of patent infringement suits, but plagiarism. 
Consequently, lack of access to the infringed copyrighted work is a 
24 These practical details are discussed in Buckles, "Property Rights in Creative Works 
-A Comparison of Copyright and Patent Laws," 32 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 414 at 424 (1950). 
25 66 Stat. L. 811 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. (1952 Supp.) §§271, 154. 
2617 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1. 
21 In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 at 350-351, 28 S.Ct. 722 (1907), the 
Supreme Court, in refusing to restrain sales by a retailer of a copyrighted book at a certain 
price, reached its conclusion " .•• in view of the language of the statute, read in the light 
of its main purpose tp secure the right of multiplying copies of the work. • • ." 
2817 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §9; Rules of Practice, United States Patent Office 
§§1.41 to 1.47 (1951). The Patent Office Rules require the inventor to make the applica-
tion but permit issuance of the patent to the assignee. 
29 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 511 at 528 (1871). 
ao Ibid. 
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defense. Where denied, access may be proved indirectly by showing a 
striking similarity between the two works or by other evidentiary facts.31 
Where access is admitted, the presumption of copying raised by slavish 
identity will be difficult to overcome.32 As in the case of design patents, 
however, the language of the courts vests the standard in the average 
person33 rather than the experts.34 
D. , Subject Matter. Another distinction arises out of the differ-
ence in criteria for protectability: design patents must meet the four 
requirements of novelty, originality, ornamentality, and invention-
and the most difficult of these is "invention."35 While language in some 
opinions indicates that the courts will insist on the presence of the 
inventive faculty36 to the same extent as in the case of mechanical 
patents,37 the suggestion that" ... there may be often more inventive 
genius displayed by the court in finding invention in design patents 
than the inventor disclosed in placing it there"38 probably holds more 
31 HOWELL, Tm, COPYRIGHT I.Aw 122 (1952). See statement in Arnstein v. Porter, 
(2d Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 464 at 468: "If evidence of access is absent, the similarities 
must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant independently 
arrived at the same result." 
32 Pellegrini v. Allegrini, (D.C. Pa. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 610 at 612. On the other hand, 
in plaintiff's attempt to prove infringement, "It certainly is not necessary that it be what 
is commonly called a Chinese copy." As there pointed out, similarity of two works may 
simply be the result of the same subject matter. 
aa E.g., Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, (D.C. Cal. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 126 
("The standard of the ordinary observer"); Contemporary Arts v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 
(D.C. Mass. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 739 at 744, quoting with approval Allegrini v. De Angelis, 
(D.C. Pa. 1944) 59 F. Supp. 248 ("whether the ordinary reasonable person would fail to 
differentiate ••• or would consider them dissimilar by reasonable observation"); Schwartz 
v. Universal Pictures Co., (D.C. Cal. 1945) 85 F. Supp. 270 at 274 (" ... impression 
to me, not as a judge, not as a person who may be more or less familiar with literature, 
but as an average person"); McConnor v. Kaufman, (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 738 
at 744 ("and the ordinary observer rule is an accepted test"). Cf. majority and dissenting 
opinions in Arnstein v. Porter, (2d Cir. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 464. 
34 Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, (D.C. Cal. 1937) 17 F. Supp. 816 at 818; Cain v. 
Universal Pictures Co., (D.C. Cal. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 1013 at 1015-1016 (" ... not upon 
the minute, scalpel-like dissection of an expert who transmutes each incident into an 
abstraction or sublimation in order to find identity, but upon the impression of sameness 
which the two works carry to the ordinary reader and observer.") 
35 The requirement that the invention be "useful" was eliminated in 1902. See 
discussion infra. 
36 Cases collected in SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 42-43 (1929). 
37 " ••• the test for invention is to be considered the same for designs as for mechanical 
patents; i.e., was the new combination within the range of the ordinary routine designer?" 
L. Hand, J., in Strause Gas Iron Co. v. William M. Crane Co., (2d Cir. 1916) 235 F. 126 
at 131. Statements to like effect may be found elsewhere, but this proposition may be 
open to question in view of the recent controversy over applicable standards of invention 
for mechanical patents. A different approach is indicated in some of the opinions: "A 
design patent necessarily must relate to subject matter comparatively trivial and the courts 
have looked with greater leniency upon design patents than patents for other inventions." 
Dominick & Haff v. R. Wallace & Sons Mfg. Co., (2d Cir. 1913) 209 F. 223 at 224. 
38 Charles Boldt Co. v. Turner Bros. Co., (7th Cir. 1912) 199 F. 139 at 142. 
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than a kernel of truth.39 Nonetheless, as l~ng as the statutory require-
ment exists, the standard will necessarily be different from that appli-
cable in copyright law, where the only requirement is originality.40 
Statutory History 
• Although developments in the patent and copyright laws since the 
Constitutional Convention in 1789 have been documented in other 
literature,41 a brief review of the history of currents in design patent and 
copyright legislation aids in understanding policies underlying the two 
forms of statutory protection. Legislative history is relevant since solu-
tions to the borderland problem are generally phrased in terms of the 
"intention of Congress."42 
The source of both types of protection is of course the Constitution. 
In the well-known Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, Congress is delegated 
authority "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries." The colonies, by general 
copyright laws and special patent legislation,43 had recognized the 
benefit accruing to the public when thi~ type of protection was granted 
to authors and inventors, and consequently the matter did not arouse 
controversy in the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.44 
Precedent afforded by English practice made it seem natural and desir-
able to enable Congress to encourage progress in these related fields by 
doling out exclusive rights in standardized instances. The essential 
fact, however, a fact often reiterated in the opinions, is that the benefit 
to the public, in the case of copyright and of patent, was the controlling 
39 The standards used to measure an "invention" in "appearance'' would seem neces-
sarily less objective than in the case of mechanical patents. Whether this is the reason, or 
because it is inherently easier to make advance over prior art in the design area, case-by-case 
development of the applicable standards seems less rigorous for design patents, as indicated 
by the quotation in the text. For the view that this analysis may represent divergence of 
value judgments, see 66 HARv. L. REv. 877 at 883 (1953). 
40'A few scattered statements to the contrary may be found: " ••• the same test is to 
be applied as in the case of patents; that is, it must indicate an exercise of the inventive 
genius as distinguished from mere mechanical skill or change." Arnstein v. Edward B. 
Marks Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 535 at 536. But see 40 GEo. L.J. 327 (1952). 
41 E.g., 2 Ctmns, CONSTITUTIONAL HrsTORY 339-340 (1854); Penning, "The Origin 
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution," 17 GEo. L.J. 109 (1929); 27 
IND. L.J. 130 (1951); 21 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 353 (1953); BoWXER, CoPYRIGKr, !Ts 
HrsTORY AND !Ts LAw (1912); Hudson, "A Brief History of the Development of Design 
Patent Protection in the United States," 30 J. PAT. OPP. Soc. 380 (1948). 
42Wm:L, COPYRIGHT LAW 227 (1917). 
43 17 GEo. L.J. 109 at 115 (1929). See also Penning, "Copyright Before the Con-
stitution," 17 J. PAT. OPP. Soc. 379 (1935). 
44 17 GEo. L.J. 109 at 114. No controversy occurred in the states when adoption 0£ 
the Constitution was in progress, and the Federalist referred to copyright and patent law 
in a few short lines. 
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motivation prompting the constitutional grant of power. "Not that any 
particular class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but because 
the policy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in 
that it will stimulate writing and invention, to give some bonus to 
authors and inventors."45 
Developments in Copyright Legislation 
The history of copyright legislation represents a gradual extension 
of the areas of protection and an inclusion of more and more new types 
of subject matter. Among the many statutes passed by Congress since 
1789, five stand out as significant to discussion of the present problem. 
The first piece of public legislation on copyright was proposed in 
January, 1790;46 a few months later the Act of May 31, 1790, was 
passed.47 This statute conferred on "authors of any map, chart, book 
or books already printed" who obtained copyright the "sole right and 
liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending"48 the protected 
articles for a fourteen year period, with a right of renewal for an 
additional fourteen years. The act established procedures in infringe-
ment proceedings, and required that before copyright could be valid 
copies of the work should be deposited with the clerk of the proprietor's 
local district court and the Secretary of State. 
By virtue of the Act of April 29, 1802,49 the second major copyright 
law, the list of persons enjoying .benefits under the Copyright Act was 
expanded. The new coverage was granted to persons "who shall invent 
and design, engrave, etc, or work . . . any historical or other print or 
prints .... " The act also included notice and forfeiture provisions. 
Several substantial changes were introduced along with the first 
general revision of the copyright laws in 1831, when legislation was 
enacted50 extending protection to authors of musical compositions, and 
lengthening the copyright period from fourteen to twenty-eight years 
with a fourteen year renewal period. Subsequent minor laws dealt with 
a variety of subjects.51 Then in 1870 the second general revision of the 
45 H. Rep. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d sess., 7 (1909). 
46 The first actual reference to copyright was made in Congress April 15, 1789, when 
a publisher petitioned the House for protection. CoPYRIGHT lN CoNGREss, 1789-1904, 
prepared by Thorvald Solberg, 112 (1905). 
471 Stat. L. 124 (1790). 
48 It is interesting that while the essence of a copyright proprietor's protection is often 
said to be the right to prevent others from "copying" the word "copy" did not appear in 
the 1790 description of the author's rights. 
49 2 Stat. L. 171 (1802). 
50 Act of February 3, 1831, 4 Stat. L. 436. 
51Twenty-five public laws were passed in the period 1789-1904. Solberg, supra note 
46 at 84-93. 
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copyright laws was effected as part of the consolidated Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Act.62 This act repealed former laws and added 
considerable material to existing copyright concepts. Protection was 
granted for a "painting, drawing, chroma, statue, statuary, and . . . 
models or designs intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts."63 
Passage of this act, with its expanded definitions of copyrightable 
subject matter, prepared the path to overlapping protection, since the 
same act, in the sections dealing with patents, retained the description 
of design patentability which had existed (in substance) since 1842: 
"any new and original design for a manufacture, bust, statue, alto-
relievo, or bas-relief; . . . any new and original impression, orna-
ment, pattern, print, or picture, to be printed, painted, cast, or 
otherwise placed on or worked into any article of manufacture; or 
any new, useful, and original shape or configuration of any article 
f f "54 o manu acture .... 
There were some works of art which would have been covered by both 
sections but for the requirement in the copyright section that the prod-
ucts be "intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts."55 Even with 
this provision, however, potential double coverage existed; the most 
striking example was the case of statuary-each of the sections spe-
cifically mentioned statues. 
One final copyright statute, the Act of 1909,56 is important to the 
present problem. This act, which forms the basis of our copyright law 
today, constituted a complete revision and amendment of previous copy-
right laws, and contained substantive changes material to this discus-
sion.57 Copyright protection was extended to "all the writings of an 
52 Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. L. 198. 
53 Id., §86. 
54Id., §71. 
55 Emphasis supplied. Importance of the distinction between the "£ne arts" and other 
arts seems to have been recognized by Congress, for in 1874 an act was adopted providing 
in part that " ••. the words 'Engraving,' 'cut' and 'print' shall be applied only to pictorial 
illustrations or works connected with the fine arts, and no prints or labels designed to be 
used for any other articles of manufacture shall be entered under the copyright law, but 
may be registered in the Patent Office ..•• " Act of June 18, 1874, 18 Stat. L. 78. This 
distinction was observed in the lower courts; e.g., J. L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, (C.C. 
Ill. 1896) 72 F. 168, in which copyright enforcement was refused since the purpose with 
which plaintiff's pictures of bathtubs were registered was not to show them as works of 
the fine arts but rather for advertising. Importance of the distinction was cut down in 
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298 (1903), when 
Justice Holmes concluded that even if the "fine arts" limitation applied to "pictorial illus-
trations,'' circus advertisements could properly be copyrighted because of the illustrations. 
56 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. L. 1075. 
57 In addition to the changes mentioned in the text, this act lengthened the renewal 
period to 28 years. 
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author."58 When this clause was read in conjunction with the famous 
Sarony case/9 which had held photographs copyrightable despite the 
constitutional argument that such were not "writings" of an "author," 
the sweep of protection was broadened considerably. More significant, 
however, for purposes of this discussion, was the deletion of the quali-
fying clause "intended to be perfected as works of the fine arts." The 
new standard, one of eleven60 classifications introduced by this act, was 
simply 'Works of art; models or designs for works of art." Although this 
change was a salutary one, it contributed to the danger of overlapping 
in two ways: (1) the removal of the "fine arts" qualification muddied 
the line of demarcation between purely aesthetic articles and useful 
works of art;61 and (2) the omission of any reference to the "intention" 
of the proprietor seemed to represent congressional dissatisfaction with 
intention as an ingredient in determining what is copyrightable.62 
These were the last major changes in copyright law; the purpose of 
the Act of 1947, in addition to enacting Title 17 of the United States 
Code into positive law, was to rearrange and repeal various prior laws.63 
The fundamental statutory material of the Act of 1909 was retained. 
The current visible throughout this stream of legislation has been 
extension of copyright protection to more and more products of artistic 
endeavor. Consequently, it is not too surprising that eventually this 
gradual expansion began to eat into areas formerly covered by design 
patent law. 
Along with statutory developments, practices followed in the Copy-
58 The text writers interpret this addition as making everything copyrightable which 
could constitutionally be made copyrightable. WEIL, CoPYRIGHT LAW 214 (1917); 
HoWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAw 8 (1952). But see language of the Committee Report, 
supra note 45 at p. 10: "Section 4 is declaratory of existing law. It was suggested that the 
word 'works' should be substituted for the word 'writings,' in view of the broad construction 
given by the courts to the word 'writings,' but it was thought better to use the word 
'writings,' which is the word found in the Constitution. It is not intended by the use of 
this word to change in any way the construction which the courts have given to it." 
59 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279 (1884). 
60 Classes (I) and (m) were added by Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. L. 488. 
61 Testimony by the Librarian of Congress during the hearings which led to the Act 
of 1909 supports the position that Congress intended an expansion of coverage by the elimi-
nation of the "line arts" qualification: "The term 'works of art' is deliberately intended as 
a broader specification than 'works of the fine arts' in the present statute with the idea that 
there is subject-matter (for instance, of applied design, not yet ~thin the province of 
design patents), which may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright Jaw." 
Hearings, before Committees on Patents, on S. 6330 and R.R. 19853, 59th Cong., 1st 
sess., 11 (1906). 
62 See discussion of argument in the Stein cases over "intention" as a factor in copy-
rightability, infra p. 52 et seq. 
63 Act of July 30, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 652. For discussion as to whether by this legis-
lation Congress intended to adopt previous interpretations given by Copyright Office 
Regulations, see 27 Im>. L.J. 130 at 135, note 30 (1951). 
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right Office demand attention. The early Rules and Regulations, 64 
issued soon after enactment of the Act of 1909, continued by admin-
istrative rule-making the distinction between "£.ne" arts and works of 
art having a useful purpose, a distinction which apparently had been 
abandoned by the Act of 1909. The statement of the Rules was as 
follows: 
"12(g) Works of art. This term includes all works belonging 
fairly to the so-called £.ne arts. (Paintings, drawings, and sculp-
ture). Productions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and 
character are not subject to copyright registration, even if artistically 
made or ornamented. No copyright exists in toys, games, dolls, 
advertising, novelties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, 
embroideries, garments, laces, woven fabrics, or any similar arti-
cl "65 es. 
Subsequent amendment of these rules represented a short step away 
from a black-white distinction based on utility. The second sentence 
of the regulation quoted above became: 
"The protection of productions of the industrial arts utilitarian 
in purpose and character, even if artistically made or ornamented, 
depends upon action under the patent law; but registration in the 
Copyright Office has been made to protect artistic drawings not-
withstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles of manu-
facture."66 
Although these regulations were open to the criticism that they ignored 
the spirit of the changes made by the Act of 1909, the Copyright Office 
operated on the premise that design patent and copyright should and 
could be separated.67 Not until 1948 were the Regulations susceptible 
of an interpretation permitting copyright of a work of art which con-
temporaneously possessed utilitarian features; in that year the ap-
plicable regulation was amended to read: 
"§ 202.8 Works of art (Class G) ... (a) In general. This 
class includes works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their form 
hut not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such 
64 Subject to the approval of the Librarian of Congress, the Register of Copyrights is 
authorized to make rules and regulations for the registration of copyrights. 17 U.S.C. (Supp. 
V, 1952) §207. 
65WmL, CoPYRIGB."l' LAw 625 (1917). Emphasis supplied. 
66 Regulation l2(g) (1926). Note that the second clause of the quoted Regulation 
was in accord with cases holding that copyright is not lost by later incorporation of the 
subject matter into useful articles. E.g., Falk v. T. P. Howell & Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1888) 
37 F. 202; King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, (2d Cir. 1924) 299 F. 533. However, 
the clause did limit copyrightability to "artistic drawings" in this category. 
67 27 hm. L.J. 130 at 133 (1951). 
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as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as all 
works belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings, and 
sculpture." 68 
45 
Examination of these three regulations in chronological order indicates 
a gradual relaxation by the Copyright Office in the standards it imposed 
on potential copyright proprietors of useful works of art. This meta-
morphosis appears in the change from the mandate that products 
"utilitarian in purpose and character" are not subject to copyright even 
though artistically made, to the guarded insertion of a clause protecting 
artistic drawings once copyrighted though subsequently put to func-
tional use, and finally to the present statement that works of art are to 
be protected except insofar as their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned. 69 This shift in Copyright Office announced policy70 accords 
with the apparent desire of Congress in the Act of 1909 fully to exercise 
its delegated power in granting protection to "all the writings of an 
th " au or. 
Developments in Design Patent Legislation 
Birth of the design patent occurred in 1842 when Congress, in 
enacting the Patent Act of August 29, 184 2, 71 established a new kind of 
seven-year patent for inventors of 
" ... any new and original design for a manufacture, whether of 
metal or other material or materials, or any new and original design 
for the printing of woollen, silk, cotton, or other fabrics, or any 
new and original design for a bust, statue, or bas relief or compo-
sition in alto or basso relieve, or any new and original impression 
or ornament, or to be placed on any article of manufacture, the 
same being formed in marble or other material, or any new and 
useful pattern, or print, or picture, to be either worked into or 
worked on, or printed or painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any 
article of manufacture, or any new and original shape or configura-
tion of any article of manufacture .... "72 
68 37 C.F.R. §202.S(a) (1949). Emphasis supplied. But see reference to actual 
practice of the Copyright Office, infra note 152. 
69 The Regulation is subject to a possible alternative interpretation. Thus the defend-
ant in Stein v. Mazer, infra note 117, argued that ''The very wording of the above regu-
lation, which was promulgated by the Copyright Office itself indicates clearly that the 
Copyright Office excludes from its orbit of authority any right to grant monopolies on 
articles which have mechanical or utilitarian aspects, such as electric table lamps here under 
consideration." Brief for Defendants-Appellees, No. 6572, United States Court of Appeals 
for the 4th Circuit 11 (1953). 
70 For actual practice of the Office, see note 152 infra. 
11 5 Stat. L. 543 (1842). 
72 Jd. at 544. 
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Most of the basic matter covered in thel842 statute was left unchanged 
by the Act of March 2, 1861,73 which repealed the former law. One 
innovation in this act which has considerable significance in a com-
parison of patent and copyright rights and remedies was the provision 
that the inventor desiring a design patent would be given an option 
of three and a half, seven, or fourteen years of protection. Nine years 
later design patent coverage was limited somewhat by the consolidated 
Patent, Trade Mark and Copyright Act of 1870 referred to above, but 
the essential provisions remained intact. 
One change effected by the Act of 1870 which did cause difficulties 
was the addition of the word "useful."74 The term was sometimes 
construed to mean "adaptation to producing pleasant emotions";75 in 
one case, decided even before the Act of 1870, utility itself was held to 
be the basis of a design patent. 76 A more sound approach interpreted 
"useful" to mean ornamental as applied to a useful article, so that the 
new appearance to a manufactured article "may enhance its salable 
value, . . . and be a meritorious service to the public."77 
Radical modification in language came with the Act of 1902,78 in 
which Congress ceased its practice of specifically enumerating classes 
of patentable subject matter and shrunk the standard to a simple "any 
new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture." 
This criterion remains in the present statute.79 One main purpose of 
this change was to eliminate the bothersome word "useful"; although 
"artistic" was suggested originally by the Commissioner of Patents, the 
Committee on Patents recommended "ornamental" as the substitute.80 
73 12 Stat. L. 246 (1861). 
74 The Acts of 1842 and 1861 spoke of a "new and useful pattern, or print, or picture 
••• fixed on, any article of manufacture," but in 1870 Congress amended "any new and 
original shape or configuration of any article of manufacture" by adding "useful" as a 
modifier. 
75 Ex parte Parkinson, 1871 C.D. 251; Rowe v. Blodgett, (2d Cir. 1901) 112 F. 61 
at 62. 
76 "Articles have been, and are being constantly, patented as designs which possess 
no element of the artistic or ornamental, but are valuable solely because, by a new shape 
or configuration, they possess more utility than the prior forms of like articles." Ex parte 
Bartholomew, 1869 C.D. 103 at 105. 
77 Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall..(81 U.S.) 511 at 525 (1871). And see discussion 
of the meaning of useful in the 1842, 1861, and 1870 statutes in SIMONDS, DESIGN 
PATENTS (1874). 
1s 32 Stat. L. 193, c. 783 (1902). 
10 53 Stat. L. 1212 (1939), 35 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §73. 
so The immediate effect of the amendment was a decrease in the number of design 
patent applications; this fact, along with later judicial decisions, represented substantial 
attainment of the Patent Office's goal to eliminate the design patent as a means of protecting 
advances primarily of a mechanical or functional nature. Hudson, "A Brief H~tory of the 
Development of Design Patent Protection in the United States," 30 J. PAT, OFF. Soc. 
380 at 392 (1948). 
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Case Law 
A. Other Than the Stein Cases. Forming a backdrop to the 
current Stein litigation, which has presented in pinpoint fashion the 
borderland problem, a number of previous cases have dealt with one or 
another phase of the interrelation of the two statutes. Common to the 
opinions is judicial condemnation of attempts to obtain double pro-
tection. 
Several substantive issues may arise when plaintiff asserts copyright 
or design patent rights in works of art having utilitarian features. 
I. Whether the work is proper subject matter within the meaning 
of the statute. Although nothing in the Code or Regulations mentions 
the presence or absence of utility as a test for copyrightability (with· the 
exception of the Regulation including in section 5 (g) works of art 
"insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned"), the probability in a given case that an article is patentable 
will no doubt inHuence a court in determining copyrightability. In the 
words of one textwriter, " . . . in doubtful cases the Courts will hold 
that, presumptively, !he fact that a given work is patentable is ground 
for holding it is not copyrightable. . . . "81 The apprehension that 
as a practical matter copyright validity will secure monopoly rights 
(properly the reward furnished by patent law) for the longer period of 
protection may influence the decision in certain cases. 82 In practice 
the Copyright Office has not followed this approach, and has refused 
to deny registration merely because of the possible utilitarian aspects 
of an article. Thus, registration has been granted for, inter alia, stained 
glass windows, bas-relief bronze doors, sculptures embodied in book-
ends, candlestick holders, sanctuary lamps, paperweights, automobile 
radiator caps, and savings banks.83 In each case registration was granted 
because the article was basically a work of art; the Register of Copy-
rights simply ignored the presence of the utilitarian aspects in deter-
s1 WmL, CoPYBIGHT LAw 84 (1917). 
82 E.g., Davis v. Comitti, 52 L.T. 539 at 540 (1885). Similar reasoning appears in 
Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 910 at 911, where 
declaratory relief against the Register of Copyrights regarding right to register a temperature 
recording chart was denied: " ••• to copyright the charts would in effect continue appel-
lant's monopoly of its machines beyond the time authorized by the patent law." 
83 Brief of the Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae, in Stein v. Mazer, No. 6572, 
United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, 12-13. Footnote 2 to this brief gives 
further examples: altar candle stick, sanctuary lamp model, set of dishes for Tabernacle 
service, sundial, Egyptian Jardiniere. illustrative examples may be found in the annual 
Catalogs of Copyright Entries [required to be published by 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) 
§210]. Examples of articles denied registration because of a wholly utilitarian nature, even 
though graced with a pleasing design, are refrigerators, clocks, stoves, gasoline pumps, and 
oil dispensers. 
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mining whether there was proper subject matter of copyright. The 
courts have held valid copyright claims to useful objects in the "works 
of art" and other categories-e.g., a candle holder,84 playing cards,85 
Christmas wrapping paper designs,86 and paintings used as circus 
posters87 or cigar advertisements.88 The same result is reached when 
the issue is infringement-the fact that the defendant's copy accom-
plishes some useful purpose does not avoid liability.89 Despite these 
holdings, in some cases the defendant's position that the particular 
article in suit properly belongs under the other statute will prevail. 90 
2. Whether the availability of one type of protection precludes the 
other. (a) Where only one is sought. In two decisions involving 
possible overlap of copyright and mechanical patent protection it has 
been held that the two fields are mutually exclusive. The court in 
Taylor Instrument Companies v. Fawley-Brost Co., in denying copy-
right protection to charts used in recording temperature, said: 
'While it may be difficult to determine in which field pro-
tection must be sought, it is plain, so we think, that it must be in 
one or the other; it cannot be found in both. In other words, there 
is no overlapping territory, even though the line of separation may 
in some instances be difficult of exact ascertainment."91 
This analysis has not been carried over to the design patent-copyright 
area, where a common ground of protection of appearance is evident; 
there the courts often speak of choice of protection. The first case 
clearly announcing this latter doctrine was De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker 
& Kessler Co.,92 in 1910. An artist commissioned to paint a design for 
Christmas wrapping paper produced an artistic painting of holly, 
B4Pellegrini v. Allegrini, (D.C. Pa. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 610. 
85 Richardson v. Miller, (C.C. Mass. 1877) 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,791 at 722. 
86 De Jonge & Co. v. Breuker & Kessler Co., (C.C. Pa. 1910) 182 F. 150. 
87BJeistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298 (1903). 
88 Schumacher v. Schwencke, (C.C. N.Y. 1885) 25 F. 466. 
89 Falk v. Howell, (C.C. N.Y. 1888) 37 F. 202 (copyright of photograph infringed 
by raised leather figure on furniture); Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., 
(2d Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 276 (copyright of "Betty Boop" cartoon infringed by doll 
reproductions); King Features v. Fleischer, (2d Cir. 1924) 299 F. 533 at 535, 536 (copy-
right of "Spark Plug" cartoon infringed by doll reproduction; 'We do not think it avoids 
the infringement of the copyright to take the substance or idea, and produce it through a 
different medium. • . . The concept of beauty expressed in the materials of statuary or 
drawing, is the thing which is copyrighted. That is what the infringer copies."). 
90 E.g., Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., (7th Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 98; 
Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, (D.C. Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 910. For the view that 
perhaps this factor is present only when the protection sought is copyright, see 38 lowA 
L. RBv. 334 (1953). 
91 (7th Cir. 1943) 139 F. (2d) 98 at 99; see Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, supra 
note 90. 
02 (C.C. Pa. 1910) 182 F. 150. 
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spruce, and mistletoe leaves. In a subsequent copyright infringement 
action based on this design, infringement by defendant was assumed, 
as was the intention of the artist and his patron to use the design com-
mercially. The principal defense relied upon was that the painting 
should have been patented under the design patent law. In rejecting 
this argument of mutual exclusiveness as controlling, the federal circuit 
court said, 
"It is; I think, difficult to see how a painting that may be either 
copyrighted or patented can be said to be 'designed' for one rather 
than for the other form of protection until the author or owner 
makes his :final choice. Up to that time he may do what he pleases 
with his property. If he chooses to copyright it as a work of art, 
he may do so; if he prefers to patent it as a design, he is free to do 
this also .... 
" . . . Ordinarily, of course, there is no difficulty. Not many 
paintings are suitable for use as designs, and only a few designs 
possess the qualities demanded by the :fine arts. But it is easily 
conceivable that here and there a painting may be eligible for 
either class, and the water color in question is, I think, an excellent 
example."93 
Subsequent cases have referred to this reasoning with approval.94 It 
was followed as a basis for the decision in Jones Bros. Co. v. Under-
koffler,95 a suit for copyright infringement. The district court there 
concluded that plaintiff's decorative design for a memorial monument 
was eligible for either patent or copyright, and gave relief despite the 
defendant's contention that the monument should have been patented 
as a design for an article of manufacture.96 
(b) Where both are sought. Although the courts have recog-
nized that a proprietor enjoys this election, the line is drawn when he 
attempts to obtain the benefits of both spheres of protection. Dictum 
93 Id. at 151, 152. The court went on to find that while the design was proper subject 
matter of copyright, plaintiff's method of posting copyright notice did not comply with 
copyright provisions, and on this ground relief was denied. The court of appeals and the 
Supreme Court affirmed on this ground, reserving opinion on the election issue. (3d Cir. 
1911) 191 F. 35; 235 U.S. 33, 35 S.Ct. 6 (1914). 
94 In re Blood, (D.C. Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 772; Korzybski v. Underwood, (2d Cir. 
1929) 36 F. (2d) 727. Cf. William A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 
(D.C. Pa. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 264. 
95 (D.C. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 729. 
ll6 At page 730 the court said, "It is apparent that under the above definitions of 
manufacture and art a certain object may be an article of manufacture as well as a work 
of art and the design therefor might well come under the Design Patent Law as a design 
for an article of manufacture or under the Copyright Act as a design for a work of art." 
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in the De Jonge case, supra, was the foundation of this theory. The 
court stated, at page 152: 
"Since [the design] was qualified for admission into the two 
statutory classes, I see no reason why it might not be placed in 
either. But it could not enter both. The method of procedure, 
the term of protection, and the penalties for infringement, are so 
different that the author or owner of a painting that is eligible for 
both classes must decide to which region of intellectual effort the 
work is to be assigned, and he must abide by that decision. . . . 
Such a work may be used in both the fine and the useful arts; but 
it can have protection in only one of these classes. The author or 
owner is driven to his election, and must stand by his choice." 
In none of the cases in this area has double protection been justified by 
holding or dictum. In one case plaintiff obtained relief for infringe-
ment of both design patent and copyright on the same ''kewpie" dolls; 
however, this decision was based upon a consent decree in which 
defendant estopped himself from contesting the validity of the copy-
right.97 Generally the approach has been that once the artist seeks 
shelter under one statute, protection under the other is lost. The 
primary rationale for this position is probably fear of undue extension 
of exclusive rights; thus in a case where the proprietor's design for a 
hosiery ticket had already been registered as a label ( copyright pro-
tection), the Commissioner of Patent's refusal to grant a design patent 
was upheld, since the course urged by the applicant "would result for 
all practical purposes in an extension of the design monopoly."98 In 
addition, two legalistic arguments for the theory have been suggested. 
In Korzybski 11. Underwood & Underwood, Inc.,99 plaintiff had been 
granted a patent on a scientific model allegedly illustrating Einstein's 
theories. Later he registered the model with the Copyright Office. 
When defendant photographed the model, plaintiff brought suit for 
copyright infringement. Relief was denied, in part on the ground that 
by the patent application and grant plaintiff had made a full disclosure 
of his invention to the public, except for the right to make, use and· 
vend it for a certain period, and consequently that everything disclosed 
became part of the public domain. Since the work was part of the 
public domain (save the exceptions mentioned), it could not properly 
97Wilson v. Haber Bros., (2d Cir. 1921) 275 F. 346. The court made plain its reser-
vation of opinion as to the propriety of copyrighting the doll. 
98 In re Blood, (D.C. Cir. 1927) 23 F. (2d) 772. In 1927 copyright registration of 
commercial prints and labels was administered by the Patent Office. This function was 
transferred to the Copyright Office in 1939. 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §6. 
99 (2d Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 727. 
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be the subject matter of copyright.100 The second idea was expressed 
in an ex parte opinion delivered in the Patent Office.101 Applicant for 
a design patent on a roof design had previously registered the design 
for copyright as a work of art. The Examiner's decision adverse to the 
applicant was affirmed. It was pointed out that part of the considera-
tion given by a patent applicant is recognition that the public will be 
entitled to use the invention at the expiration of the patent. If the 
public will be unable to use the article at the expiration of the design 
patent, because of continuing copyright protection, this consideration 
will be lacking, and the patent should not issue. 
3. The question of infringement. Although somewhat collateral 
to the principal inquiry of this paper, the problem of whether certain 
conduct of a defendant infringes a concededly valid copyright some-
times involves the interrelation of copyright and patent principles. A 
recent Court of Claims decision, Fulmer v. United States,102 illustrates 
the problem. Plaintiff copyrighted a design showing a parachute with 
irregular curved lines painted on the cloth. From information disclosed 
by the design (according to the allegations) the United States produced 
camouB.aged parachutes. The government's motion to dismiss was 
granted, the court pointing out that plaintiff had not patented his 
design and thereby obtained a monopoly of the process, but had sought 
the limited protection available under copyright law. Primary reliance 
was placed upon Baker 11. Selden,1°3 the famous. case in which the 
author of a book explaining a system of bookkeeping was denied copy-
right protection as to use of the system itself. Other cases close but 
distinguishable involve three-dimensional. reproduction of two-dimen-
sional copyrighted cartoons-particularly the "toy doll" cases104-in 
which infringement has generally been found. These decisions have 
been referred to in the Stein cases, infra, where the question is some-
times posed as to whether manufacture of a lamp can infringe copyright 
100 Section 7 of the Copyright Act provided "That no copyright shall subsist in the 
original text of any work which is in the public domain." The same basic provision is now 
in 17 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §8. 
lOlReported in 34 J. PAT. OFP. Soc. 463 (1952). 
102 (Ct. Cl. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 1021. 
103 101 U.S. 99 (1880). The court also referred to Muller v. Triborough Bridge 
Authority, (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 298 (copyright of novel bridge approach not 
infringed by construction of such a bridge). See also Brief English Systems v. Owen, (2d 
Cir. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 555 (shorthand system). 
104 Fleischer Studios v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., (2d Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 276; 
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, (2d Cir. 1924) 299 F. 533. Cf. Hill v. Whalen, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1914) 220 F. 359 (dramatic performance held infringement of ''Mutt and 
Jeff" cartoon copyright); Jones v. Underkoffler, (D.C. Pa. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 729 (cemetery 
use of memorial held infringement). 
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of a statuette. The fear always hovers that a copyright registrant is 
attempting in an easy fashion to secure monopoly rights in the in-
vention of an art, rather than mere protection against plagiarism of his 
method of expression. 
B. The Stein Cases. Imitations of the creative efforts of Rena 
Stein, designer of the lamp statuettes involved in the currently 
important Stein cases,1°5 have provoked a number of infringement suits. 
At this writing the validity of the Stein copyrights has been adjudicated 
in four United States district courts and three United States courts of 
appeals, appeal is pending in another circuit, and a petition for certiorari 
is on :6.le in the Supreme Court. In the seven decisions to date, three 
have gone in favor of the Steins and four against. Two of the three 
appellate decisions, however, decided in May and June of 1953, have 
sustained the copyright claim. 
A folio of the litigation, and the treatment received by the plaintiffs' 
claim in each case (in brackets), includes: 
Stein v. Expert Lamp_ Co., (D.C. Ill. 1/23/51) 96 F. Supp. 
97 [rejected]; affirmed, (7th Cir. 5/2/51) 188 F. (2d) 611 [re-
jected]; certiorari denied, 342 U.S. 629 (10/8/51) [not con-
sidered]; (D.C. Ill. 7/8/52) 107 F. Supp. 60 [collateral point]. 
Stein v. Rosenthal, (D.C. Cal. 3/21/52) 103 F. Supp. 227 
[upheld]; affirmed, (9th Cir. 6/26/53) 98 U.S.P.Q. 180 [up-
held]. 
Stein v. Benaderet, (D.C. Mich. 12/23/52) 109 F. Supp. 364 
[rejected]; appeal pending in 6th Circuit.106 
Stein v. Mazer, (D.C. Md. 2/20/53) 111 F. Supp. 359 [re-
jected]; reversed, ( 4th Cir. 5/19/53) 204 F. (2d) 472 [upheld]; 
petition for certiorari pending.107 
The :6.rst action, Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., brought in Illinois, was 
based upon theories of copyright infringement and unfair competition. 
The Steins, husband and wife who had begun the manufacturing of 
these artistic devices in 1947, had obtained copyright on "statuettes" 
under ·the "works of art" classification in section 5 of the code. De-
fendant allegedly infringed. Undisputed were the facts that both 
105 These cases are sometimes referred to as the "Reglor" litigation, because plaintiffs 
(the same in all the suits) manufacture and sell their products under the name Reglor of 
California. Recent law review commentary relating to this litigation includes 66 HARv. 
L. REv. 877 (1953); 21 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 353 (1953); 37 MINN. L. REv. 212 (1953); 
38 lowA L. REv. 334 (1953); 27 hm. L.J. 130 (1951); 2 DEcALOGUE J. 5 (1951). 
106 No. 11,384, January 29, 1953. 
101 No. 228, October Term 1953-54, August 3, 1953. Other actions brought in New 
York and Michigan were settled out of court. [Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court 
in Mazer v. Stein, No. 228, October 12, 1953. 22 Law Week 3081.-Ed.] 
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parties had sold the statuettes as bases for table lamps, and that the 
articles produced by the two parties were practically identical.108 In 
dismissing the copyright count of the complaint, the court rested its 
determination that the statuette was not copyrightable subject matter 
upon the ground that an article intended to be put to practical use 
cannot be copyrighted. Relied upon by the court was the quotation 
from the Taylor case, supra, stating that there is no overlapping 
between (mechanical) patent and copyright protection. No reference 
was made to the cases recognizing a borderland area in the case of 
design patents and copyrights. 
Inasmuch as this was the first decision of the series, and thereby 
assumed considerable stature as precedent, a point which has been 
discussed in the subsequent opinions should be noted here. In ex-
pounding the "intended useful purpose" test, the district court stated: 
"It would seem that plaintiff's submission of the statuettes 
with the lamp mounting stubs to the copyright office was evidence 
of the practical use to which they were intended to be put. Had 
it been merely the statuette, use of the statuette thereafter in any 
practical manner would not remove it from the scope of copyright 
protection."109 
As a matter of actual fact, the photographs of the statuettes as submitted 
to the Copyright Office did not possess the mounting stubs for electrical 
connections; the court was misinformed through an inadvertence. 
Plaintiff subsequently petitioned the district court to reconsider its 
decision because of this mistake, but the petition was denied on the 
ground that its contents were "immaterial to the decision in this 
case."110 Affirmance by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
was apparently reached without consideration of the denial of the 
petition since no mention thereof was made in the opinion; in addition, 
the appellate court did not disturb the trial judge's holding that 
"plaintiffs' submission of the statuettes with the lamp mounting stubs 
to the Copyright Office was evidence of the practical use to which the 
statuettes were intended to be put .... "111 The court of appeals 
108 These uncontroverted facts characterized all the suits in this series. As referred to 
in the opinions, evidence showed that only a very few of the thousands of Stein sales were 
statuettes without lamp attachments. 
109 96 F. Supp. 97 at 98. Emphasis supplied. 
110 This information is obtained from the district court opinion in Stein v. Mazer, 
(D.C. Md. 1953) lll F. Supp. 359. Some of these facts are also reported in Stein v. 
Benaderet, (D.C. Mich. 1952) 109 F. Supp. 364. 
111188 F. (2d) 610 at 612. Cf., however, statement in Benaderet, criticizing Rosen-
thal: " ••. evidently Judge Tolin's attention had not been directed to the fact that both 
Judge La Buy and the 7 Circuit had knowledge that the Stein statuettes submitted to the 
copyright office did not include projecting lamp stubs." 109 F. Supp. 364 at 365. 
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indicated that the proper place for protection, if any, was design patent 
law. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. 
The reason that the misunderstanding of the facts may be sig-
nificant is that the district court, in a subsequent dispute over attorneys' 
fees, indicated that registration of the statuettes with the mounting 
stubs was the controlling factor: 
"The pertinent feature compelling the court to make the 
decision of January 23, 1951 was the submission to the copyright 
office of plaintiff's statuette 'having the threaded mounting stub 
to receive a lamp socket'. This technicality and the interpretation 
accorded the copyright statute defeated the plaintiff's claim."112 
Although the value of speculation is questionable, it is arguable that 
the factual misunderstanding in the Expert case was prejudicial to 
plaintiffs. The decision can be read to stand on the narrow ground 
that a work of art is not copyrightable if the depiction submitted to the 
Copyright Office itself indicates that a utilitarian purpose is contem-
plated. 
This factual distinction was relied upon in the second case, Stein 
v. Rosenthal,113 in the southern district of California. The court, in 
holding directly contrary to the decision in the Expert case, went 
farther and rejected the "intention" test as set forth in Expert. The 
court reasoned that the statuette as submitted (by photograph) to the 
Copyright Office (clearly without mounting stubs) was an artistic work 
capable of copyright registration, and that extrinsic incorporation of 
utilitarian features does not destroy protection for the statuette itself. 
The plaintiffs would not be able to enjoin manufacture of action lamps 
of similar design, but they would be entitled to enjoin copying of the 
statuette in whatever form it appeared. Rejected was defendant's 
contention that "copyright protection is very narrow and if a manu-
facturer conceives an object of utility into which or onto which copy-
righted material can be copied, the combining of a copy of a copy-
righted work of art with an object of utility destroys the protection of 
the copyright."114 In pointing•out that adoption of the defendant's 
theory would require inquiry into the subjective motivations of every 
copyright proprietor, the court squarely repudiated the intention test.115 
112 107 F. Supp. 60 at 61. 
11s (D.C. Cal. 1952) 103 F. Supp. 227, affirmed (9th Cir. 1953) 98 U.S.P.Q. 180. 
Judgment was re.ndered for defendant on the unfair competition count of the complaint. 
114 103 F. Supp. 227 at 231. 
115 ''The appropriateness of copyright registration is determined by the character of the 
registered work of art as registered and not by the ability, intent or hope of the registrant 
to use it as a dress for a utilitarian object." 103 F. Supp. 227 at 230. 
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The third round in the series, litigated in Michigan, was deter-
mined adversely to the Steins. The district court, in Stein 11. Bena-
deret, 116 expressly adopted the intention test discarded in Rosenthal, 
emphasized that "it is the intent and purpose" of the designer which are 
important, and referred plaintiffs to the design patent laws. The new 
element present in this case was a deposition by the Register of Copy-
rights to the effect that the practice of the Copyright Office was to 
register claims for copyright of any work which it considered "art" even 
if the work had utilitarian aspects. To the plaintiffs' argument that 
denial of protection would overrule years of established practice in the 
Copyright Office, the court answered that this factor would be 
immaterial even if true, since registration of an article primarily in-
tended to be useful would amount to circumvention of the design 
patent laws. 
Another setback was suffered by the Steins in Stein 11. Mazer,111 a 
case tried in the District Court for the Maryland District. In a 1953 
opinion, the court examined the previous Stein litigation and followed 
the Expert decision in the Seventh Circuit. The reasoning in the 
Rosenthal opinion, both on its interpretation of the significance of the 
factual issue involved in Expert and on its doctrinal analysis, was not 
accepted. In relying on the rationale expressed in Expert, the court 
made reference to the provision of the Copyright Regulations holding 
as proper subject matter works of art "in so far as their form but not 
their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned" and to the 
practice of the Copyright Office as disclosed by the deposition of the 
Register; the court concluded that the effect of these two considerations 
was adverse to the plaintiff, emphasizing the aspect of the deposition 
indicating "that thus, by issuing a certificate of registration the Office 
purported to give applicant no rights so far as any mechanical or utili-
tarian purpose is concerned."118 In addition, the court examined the 
history of design patent law, and reflected upon the difference in what 
is intended by each of the statutory schemes. A further analysis of the 
factual mix-up in Expert was presented, the court concluding that to 
attribute to the Seventh Circuit a holding based solely on the district 
court's narrow interpretation of its own decision119 would be to torture 
the language of the appellate opinion. 
Fortunes turned for the Steins in the early summer of 1953, when 
116 (D.C. Mich. 1952) 109 F. Supp. 364. Appeal pending in 6th Circuit, No. 11,384. 
111 (D.C. Md. 1953) 111 F. Supp. 359, reversed (4th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 472. 
118 111 F. Supp. 359 at 363. Emphasis by the court. 
119 See note 112 supra. 
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the Fourth Circuit reversed the Mazer decision and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court's holding in Rosenthal. 
Distinctive of the case in the Fourth Circuit was the £ling of a brief 
by the Register of Copyrights as amicus curiae. This brief threw 
further light on the actual practice of the· Copyright Office in the period 
since 1909, in its determinations of registrability of works of art in-
corporated into articles of manufacture. It also, inter alia, indicated 
governmental dissatisfaction with the concepts that intention is the 
controlling element (since this places an impracticable administrative 
burden on the Copyright Office), and that design patent law and copy-
right law are mutually exclusive. The court, in declaring the copy-
rights valid and infringed, accorded deference to the long practice of 
the Copyright Office, but expressly bypassed the question of whether a 
design patent-copyright borderland exists.120 Judge Dobie went on, in 
perhaps the most exhaustive opinion in the series, to review the 
pertinent cases, statutes, and regulations, quoted extensively from the 
Register's deposition, and expressly rejected the doctrine of the Expert 
case "if this case be not distinguishable" (because of the absence of 
mounting paraphernalia). The opinion is notable for its clear statement 
of the position in support of copyright protection-
"Concededly, a copyright does not purport to give to the copy-
rightee any rights to the mechanical or utilitarian uses of a work 
of art. A copyright, does, however, protect the work of art qua 
work of art without regard to any functional use to which it might 
be put. A subsequent utilization of a work of art in an article of 
manufacture in no way affects the right of the copyright owner to 
be protected against infringement of the work of art itself. The 
critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the particular work 
sought to be registered has utility but whether it is a work of art 
irrespective of its utility."121 
Latest holding in the Stein caravan is the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, affirming the district court in the 
Rosenthal case.122 The opinion, in dismissing the concept that pro-
tection is lost because of the concurrence of art and utility in the same 
article, criticized the assumption (perhaps implicit in the Benaderet 
opinion) that design patent law is to be favored to copyright law be-
120 "It is strenuously contended by plaintiffs, and by the Government in its brief as 
amicus curiae, that the Copyright Statute and the Design Patent Statute are overlapping .••• 
This is vigorously denied by defendants. We do not think it necessary, in order to decide 
the case before us, to pass upon this important question." 204 F. (2d) 472 at 480. 
~liM~ . 
122 See note 113 supra. 
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cause of the more stringent conditions precedent to patent protection.123 
The court reached a pole opposite that of the court in Expert ( which 
placed reliance on purpose and intention) in maintaining that rights 
obtained under the copyright law "cannot be affected by the gratuitous 
use of the creations by strangers for ornamental supports for a house-
hold utility-in this case a lamp."124 Perhaps more important to the 
problem of this paper, the court was the first in the Stein series to note 
affirmatively the existence of a borderland in which a given work might 
qualify under either design patent or copyright principles. Thus the 
court recognized that 
''The area in which a thing would be either a copyrightable 
work of art or a patentable design, but not the other, is perhaps 
unsurveyable. Whether a thing is a work of art or a patentable 
design, or is a patentable design and not a work of art, cannot be 
determined by excluding one from the other. A thing is a work of 
art if it appears to be within the historical and ordinary conception 
of the term art. A thing is a design by the same token. The two 
are not necessarily distinct one from the other. Neither goes to the 
functioning of a utility."125 
This, the latest judicial pronouncement on the subject at the time of 
this writing, accords with the philosophy earlier expressed in the De 
Jonge case, supra, that a producer of a work which meets the require-
ments of both statutes may, since no rule of mutual exclusion has ever 
been written into legislation, choose his alley of protection. 
Significant in these two most recent Stein adjudications are two 
propositions: (I) that copyrightability under section 5 (g) depends 
purely on whether the object submitted is a "work of art," regardless 
of a possible utilitarian function for which the object may be adaptable 
(the corollary is that intention is not a relevant consideration), and (2) 
that there does exist a twilight zone of statutory protection in which 
either a design patent or a copyright may be sought successfully, and 
that this overlap should have no influence upon a particular determina-
tion of the proper subject matter of copyright.126 
123 The court in the Benaderet case quoted Justice Bradley in Baker v. Selden, 101 
U.S. 99 (1880) ("To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art 
described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would 
be a surprise and a fraud upon the public"), and concluded that "If plaintiffs desired the 
protection they now claim, they should have submitted to the rigid scrutiny of the Patent 
Office and applied for a design patent." 109 F. Supp. 364 at 366. 
12498 U.S.P.Q. 180 at 182. 
125 Ibid. 
126 This harmonizes with the position of the Copyright Office. "Since 1909, it has 
been the settled practice of the Copyright Office to accept for copyright registration works 
of art, possessing utilitarian aspects, which might also be eligible for design patent protec-
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C. The Wearing Apparel Cases. One area of industrial design 
has been treated as a somewhat special field, that of dress designs. 
Traditionally dress designs have been denied copyright relief. A 
leading case for this proposition is Kemp & Beatley v. Hirsch,1 21 which 
based its conclusion on Rosenbach v. Dreyfuss,128 an old case refusing 
protection for pattern prints of balloons under the "prints or works of 
art" category in the then section 5. The Kemp case was decided in 
1929, long after the "fine arts" limitation in force at the time of Rosen-
bach had been wiped out by the Act of 1909. Subsequent removal of 
the Copyright Office's similar limitation by the 1948 change in regula-
tions was likewise ineffective, a 1949 textile design case reaching the 
result attained in the Kemp case.129 Particularly significant is the fact 
that in this field other relief is unavailable, unfair competition pro-
tection having been decJared unobtainable by Cheney Bros. v. Doris 
Silk Corporation,130 and design patent protection practically worthless 
because of the ephemeral nature of style designs. The dress designers' 
problem, however, is generally considered separately from other "works 
of art," because of its own peculiarities.131 
Developments in England 
By way of ·contrast to the situation in the United States, England 
has attempted, through legislation and administrative rules, to draw a 
workable line between the Copyright and Registered Designs Acts.182 
This attempt has failed to some degree, as indicated by the fact that the 
Board of Trade Committee on Copyright devoted 26 pages of its 1952 
tion were such an election made." Brief of the Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, Stein v. Mazer, ( 4th Cir. 1953) 
204 F. (2d) 472 at 15-16. 
121 (D.C. N.Y. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 291. Other statements to this effect appear in Nat 
Lewis Purses v. Carole Bags, (2d Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 475 at 476; White v. Leanore 
Frocks, (2d Cir. 1951) 120 F. (2d) 113 at 114-115 (indicating probable invalidity of most 
design patents on dresses because of lack of novelty or invention); Belding Heminway Co. 
v. Future Fashions, (2d Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 216 at 218. . 
12s (D.C. N.Y. 1880) 2 F. 217. 
129 Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 802. 
This case denied relief against plaintiff's reliance on the Act of July 31, 1939, 53 Stat. L. 
1142, which added to section 5 the words "including prints or labels used for articles of 
merchandise." As pointed out in Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., (D.C. 
N.Y. 1934) 112 F. Supp. 187, a dress designer may have copyright protection against 
copying of the drawing of the dress. 
rno (2d Cir. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 279. 
131 See 27 !ND. L.J. 130 at 136 (1951). 
132 England was the first country to enact any sort of design protection legislation. 
Act of 1787 (27 Geo. III, c. 38). 
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report to Parliament to the topic "Artistic Copyright and Industrial 
Designs."133 Consideration of the English borderland problem134 and 
the suggestions embodied in the Copyright Committee's Report are 
helpful in analyzing the the situation in the United States. 
Statutes in England comparable to American legislation are the 
Copyright Act of 1911 and the Registered Designs Act of 1949. While 
neither of these acts require any showing of "invention" such as is 
necessary in American patent cases, the design patent is issued only 
for "new" articles. The Registered Designs Act provides for the 
protection of designs applied to articles by industrial processes or means, 
designs being defined as "fe~tures of shape, configuration, pattern or 
ornament." The Copyright Act protects "artistic works" ( which in-
cludes "works of drawing'' and "works of artistic craftsmanship"). The 
possibility of overlap is clear from a reading of these two classifications. 
Principal differences between the two acts in available protection 
run parallel to differences in the American system. The Copyright Act 
protects original artistic works automatically upon their creation with-
out need for compliance with formalities, and the period of the pro-
tection is lifetime of the author plus 50 years; the Designs Act protects 
only art which is registered, and then only for five years, with two 
subsequent five year renewal periods. The Copyright Act protects a 
work of art if it is "original" in the copyright sense of being in-
dependently achieved; the Designs Act protects a work only if it is 
novel in the sense of being dissimilar to anything before created. 
Cognizant of the overlap of the two statutes, Parliament attempted 
to minimize its litigation-breeding effect. Section 22 of the Copyright 
Act provides, in essence, (1) that the Copyright Act does not apply to 
designs (a) capable of being registered under the Designs Act, and 
(b) used or intended to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied 
by any industrial process; and (2) that general rules under the Designs 
Act can be made for determining specific conditions under which such 
designs shall be deemed to be so used. The terms of the general rules 
established under this authority were as foIIows: 
"A design shaII be deemed to be used as a model or pattern to 
133 REPORT oI' THB CoPYRIGHT CoMMl'ITI!ll, Board of Trade '82-98 (1952). 
134 For an analysis of the English problem written before the Report of the Committee 
on Copyright, see RussBLL-CLARKB, COPYRIGHT AND lNnusTRIAL DESIGNS 233-243 
(1951). Any consideration of the legislative solutions to the problem as it exists in the 
United States should be taken only with the warning of the English Copyright Committee 
in mind: "It is probably impossible in drafting to avoid using broad terms, leaving the 
Courts to decide border-line cases on their merits." (At 82:) 
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be multiplied by any industrial process within the meaning of 
Section 22 of the Copyright Act, 1911 : 
(a) When the design is reproduced or is intended to be repro-
duced in more than 50 single articles . . . 
(b) When the design is · to be applied to [ certain specified 
t:I·cl ] " ar es .... 
The net effect of these rules when read in the light of section 22 is 
that if a work is capable of registration as a design, and is intended to be 
reproduced in more than 50 single articles135 or is to be applied to any 
of the articles referred to in "(b)" above, it will receive no protection 
under the Copyright Act. 
Despite this effort ·to effectuate a clear division in the area covered, 
borderland difficulties have arisen. The intention test has been 
severely criticized as inequitable and impractical, and the Report of the 
Committee on Copyright also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact 
that even under present rules many articles are capable of double pro-
tection.136 The example most cited under the English system is a 
cartoon which is copyrighted and then later applied industrially as a 
brooch or doll; if registered under the Designs Act before publication 
the article would thus meet the requirements of both statutes. 
Several solutions were considered and rejected by the committee. 
The answer ultimately recommended represents a unique contribution 
to solution of the problem. The basic proposition of the committee 
was that section 22 be amended to read somewhat as follows: 
"( 1) This Act shall not apply to designs registered under the 
Registered Designs Act, 1949. 
"(2) Copyright in designs which, although they would, if 
new or original, be capable of registration under the 
Registered Designs Act 1949, have not been so regis-
tered, shall cease as soon as any article to which the 
design has been applied, has been reproduced more than 
50 times by an industrial process by the owner of the 
copyright or with his consent." 
135 The relevant date for this "intention" is the time of making the work. King 
Features Syndicate v. Kleemann, [1941] A.C. 417. 
136 ''We are aware that double protection of a particular article may already exist under 
the Patents Act and Registered Designs Act, the first, broadly speaking, for basic construc-
tion or function, and the second for shape or appearance. But the existence of double 
protection (for two different terms) for shape or appearance alone is in our view unsatis-
factory." Report of the Copyright Committee, Board of Trade, 86-87 (1952). 
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The effect of this provision would be to establish a cut-off point so 
that copyright protection would terminate when the proprjetor at-
tempted to industrialize his design. The proposal was also made that 
the scope of this provision include all "associated designs" in addition 
to the specific design copyrighted. A safeguard for the artist who is 
unable to anticipate whether his design will be declared registrable 
as a design was embodied in the recommendation that a refusal by the 
Registrar to register a design on the ground that it is not registrable 
under Design Patent rules "should serve definitely to avoid the loss 
of artistic copyright in the particular design when exploited indus-
trially." Other specific minor qualifications were also proposed by the 
Committee.137 
This solution fits particularly the English system, which has already 
separated fairly sharply the statutes protecting original artistic works 
generally and novel industrial designs; there are, of course, meaningful 
differences between the British and American schemes of protection. 
Nonetheless, the fundamental concept of a condition subsequent repre-
sents a second attempt by the English to correlate the provisions of the 
two laws, an approach which has not yet been tried in the United 
States. For this reason it merits consideration as one possibility of 
resolving the problem.138 
Conclusions 
As demonstrated by the divergent results reached by the federal 
137The Committee summarized its recommendation as follows, at 92-93: 
"(1) artistic copyright should subsist and continue to subsist in all works which are 
original artistic works, irrespective of whether the intention of the author at the time he 
creates it is to use the work as an industrial design •.• (2) the copyright, as now, should 
continue to protect such works against copying • • • and also, with the qualifications stated 
below, against reproduction in any other 'material form whatsoever'; (3) the protection 
against others reproducing the author's work should give the author protection against 
unauthorised industrial designs copying his work, subject to (4) and (5) below; (4) the 
copyright proprietor should be relieved of the disabling effects of prior publication of the 
work if he wishes to apply it industrially and applies for registration. On such registration, 
the protection of the Copyright Act should cease for the designs of the articles as regis-
tered. On the expiry of a registration, the registered design and 'associated' designs should 
go into the public .domain; (5) if the proprietor applies the work as an industrial design 
and does not register the design before doing so, then the protection of the Copyright Act 
ceases. • . . The original work would continue to enjoy protection against direct copying 
under the Copyright Act." 
138 It should be noted that the Committee had in mind principally cases in which the 
author of a "film, picture, or cartoon'' did not originally publish as an industrial design. 
(REPORT, at 90). 
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courts in the Stein cases, the issue is a close one as to which avenue of 
protection, if either, will be open to designers of works of art which 
boast utilitarian potentialities. Difficulty at the international level 
with articles falling in the borderland area indicates that the problem is 
one of a conceptually high order and is not attributable simply to the 
particular statutory scheme which has developed in the United States. 
Suggestive of the basic trouble is the contention 'that "the whole 
£.eld of creations can be divided into only two classes: that of usefulness 
and that of beauty."139 Legislative attempts a century ago to escape 
the dilemma arising when the two functions cross in a single article 
unfortunately concentrated in the patent area, where the primary 
emphasis is upon utility. This was at best an arbitrary choice; indeed, 
it has been argued with force that in the abstract, design patent and 
copyright are much closer cousins than design patent and mechanical 
patent.140 Lending vitality to this theoretical objection to the present 
system is the probability that design patent protection for these hybrid 
articles is actually a historical accident. The £.rst law protecting in-
dustrial designs, an English statute,141 was molded on lines of protection 
established for artistic, rather than inventive, property. Unfortunately, 
however, the statute which became the model for design protection 
legislation in most countries of the world was an 1806 French law 
which, purely by accident, had the effect of separating industrial 
designs and models from artistic property.142 The misclassification has 
been continued in this country.143 It has been asserted that combina-
tion of the designation "patent" and subjection to jurisdiction of the 
Patent Office has virtually compelled the judiciary to develop design 
patent law in accordance with mechanical patent principles.144 One 
author has suggested three reasons why design protection' became 
189 See LlDAs, lNT:eRNA'rIONAL PROTECTION OF hrousTRIAL PROPERTY 365409 (1930). 
140 Umbreit, "A Consideration of Copyright," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 932 at 934 
(1939).· The same philosophy was impliedly expressed in Pellegrini v. Allegrini, (D.C. Pa. 
1924) 2 F. (2d) 610 at 610: "The motive underlying design patents and copyrights of 
works of art is one readily appreciated. The beautiful and the development of a love of the 
beautiful and of the artistic sense and taste is as much necessary to a well-rounded life as 
are the useful things," 
141 See note 132 supra. 
142 Explanation of this occurrence is detailed in LADAS, lNT:BRNATIONAL PROTECTION 
OF hrousTRIAL PROPERTY 367-370 (1930). 
148 ''The fundamental error of Congress was in classifying industrial designs with 
mechanical inventions instead of with literary and artistic work. Essentially a design is a 
work of authorship. Its merit is purely aesthetic." 7 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 540 at 541 (1925). 
144 Umbreit, "A Consideration of Copyright," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 932 at 934 
(1939). 
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modelled on patent rather than copyright principles: (I) the nature 
of the subject matter (articles of commerce as distinguished from purely 
intellectual products); (2) the source of the original suggestion (Com-
missioner of Patents); and (3) the lack of a central copyright depository 
at the time the law was passed.145 
In some ways a very aggravating example of the effects of this 
anomalous situation has been the insistence of Congress and the courts 
that design patentability depends in part upon a showing of inventive-
ness. While as an ivory tower proposition it might be urged that 
invention in appearance, the basic object of design patent protection, is 
just as possible as invention in mechanical utility,146 still the tremen-
dous practical difficulties of exploring prior art, and the distasteful 
realization that ultimately a conclusion of presence or absence of in-
ventiveness will be exceedingly more subjective than in the case of 
mechanical patents, compel a dissatisfaction with this standard for the 
design patent. It is understandable why one writer objected in 1927 
that: 
"In no branch of the Patent Office service is there more oppor-
tunity for arbitrary judgment on the part of administrative officials, 
and in no branch is there a more hazy and indefinite line of 
decisions from which to endeavor to extract principles and rules 
which should lead to the establishing of definite standards of what 
is, and what is not, patentable in the way of a design."147 
As our industrial society progresses and culture becomes more 
sophisticated, it is to be expected that one continuing trend will be the 
incorporation of aesthetic ideas into ordinary workaday objects. This 
trend is surely commendable from the standpoint of social policy and 
should be encouraged.148 Serving at times to impede advancement in 
this area is a curious anomaly, the design patent, which purports to 
reward achievements in appearance and yet subjects them to tests 
145 Hudson, "A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the 
United States," 30 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 380 at 383 (1948). 
146 "That there may be as outstanding aesthetic invention as there is mechanical, only 
barbarians would deny. • • ." Belding Heminway Co. v. Future Fashions, Inc., (2d Cir. 
1944) 143 F. (2d) 216 at 217-218. 
147 Allen, "Design Patentability," 9 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 298 at 299 (1927). Less 
imposing but nonetheless difficult is the Copyright Office's own burden of subjectivity in 
determining whether certain submitted articles constitute "works of art." 
148 Viewed from another angle: ''The pmpose of all parties interested in .industrial 
designs is the promotion of the industry and it is immaterial in a broad sense whether this 
be done by a copyright system or a patent system, so long as it is well done." 10 J. PAT. 
OFF. Soc. 297 (1928). 
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foreign, in a practical sense, to the nature of appearance. Statements 
placing the design patent mid-way between patent and copyright are 
·overgenerous.149 The philosophy of the design patent ignores the fact 
that the value of new expressions of appearance is often short-lived; 
protection from the time of creation may be vitally needed. _ 
One real evil marking the design patent is its invisible influence 
behind invalidations of copyrights, as illustrated by the Stein cases. As 
mentioned above, one may ponder whether the artist in those cases 
would not have been afforded copyright vindication'from the start were 
it not for the subtle influence of the existence of the design patent. 
The artist's contribution to society for which she seeks protection in 
the Stein cases has not been solely the application of a design to a 
lamp,150 which might present the question of invention; rather, her 
contribution has been the original sculpturing of objects of artistic 
grace. If both parties in each of the Stein cases had been selling 
statuettes alone, with no lamp attachments, plaintiff would undoubtedly 
have prevailed. Why should the mere addition of mounting stubs or 
other attachments, a factor with which copyright law has nothing to do, 
cause such a difference? It seems wise from the point of view of policy, 
and in keeping with the constitutional exhortation, to stimulate 
aesthetic development by allowance of benefits to such artists with 
disregard of the utilitarian aspects involved. One major objection to 
this approach, that in effect this confers a monopoly right on the 
proprietor, which should properly be obtainable only in the patent 
domain where exhaustive search of prior art is available, may be 
answered in two ways. First, the -proprietor does not have a monopoly 
under 'this scheme: for instance, he would be unable to prevent 
manufacture, sale, or use of identical articles by an independent creator 
knowing nothing of his work; nor, for example in the Stein situation, 
would he be able to restrain another from manufacturing and selling 
other types of sculptured :figures as lamp bases. And second, this 
objection assumes, in accordance with traditional assimilation of useful 
designs into the patent sphere, that the harder-to-get protection of the 
design patent grant is more beneficial to the public, at best a debatable 
question. 
149 "The design invention thus occupies a position intermediate between the mechanical 
invention, having a purely utilitarian function, and the art product of authorship, having a 
purely esthetic function." Ex parte Cady, 1916 C.D. 57 at 61. 
150 See note 123 supra. 
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Apparently no further change in Copyright Office Regulations 
could remedy the existing confusion in the borderland region; the 
regulations already state quite explicitly administrative approval of 
registering the artistic elements of those works which also contain 
utilitarian features.151 These Regulations were adopted by the Copy-
right Office after 40 years of official adherence to the ":6.ne arts" dis-
tinction which had prevailed prior to 1909 .152 Reversal of stated 
position after so long a period must have been motivated by strong 
conviction on the part of the agency, but judicial respect for this change 
has not been universal.153 
Probably the best answer would be legislation. Congress might 
follow a path designed to preserve the present dual system and imitate 
the example of Great Britain in providing alternative remedies ac-
cording to actual industrial application. This approach, aside from 
the criticism that it may act to penalize all but those content to reap 
small :financial harvests, would perhaps seem sufficiently unorthodox 
and difficult of administration here to be unpopular as a legislative 
proposal. A sound and more direct attack on the problem would be 
elimination of the design patent, along with either (1) transfer to 
copyright jurisdiction of the types of designs now patentable, with a 
possible cutback in the term of copyright protection (at least in the 
"works of art" category), or (2) establishment of a new hybrid registra-
tion system for industrial works of art and designs, modelled on copy-
right principles but providing a much shorter duration of the propri-
etor's exclusive rights. Repeal of the design patent provisions has been 
151 37 C.F.R. §202.8(a) (1949). 
152 The annual REPOR'r OF THI! REGISTER OF CoPYIUGHTS for 1948 states, at 3, that 
in that year "the Office reconsidered the question of what constitutes a work of art ••• 
with the result that it has broadened the list of articles which are accepted. It will not only 
continue to accept all works of fine art without question, but will also register other works 
of art if they display artistic features, whether or not • • • they have utilitarian purposes." 
This does not tell the entire story, however. "From 1909 to 1948 the Regulations • • • 
provided that works of the fine arts would be accepted ••• but that utilitarian objects ••• 
would be rejected •••• In practice, however, an object of artistic conception in a standard 
art form-e.g., sculpture or painting-has not been denied registration merely because of its 
possible utilitarian aspects .••. In 1948 the Register ••• concluded that the long-existing 
Regulations adequately defined only the extremes of permissible and non-permissible reg-
istration, leaving in doubt the works which fall intersticially between the two extremes." 
Brief of the Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the 4th Circuit, Stein v. Mazer, (4th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 472 at 11-12. And see 
204 F. (2d) 472 at 477. 
153 Stein v. Expert Lamp Co., (D.C. ill, 1951) 96 F. Supp. 97. 
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proposed to Congress before.154 Another possibility would be elimina-
tion of the "invention" requirement for design patents.165 
However, the prospect of legislation is unpromising. During and 
after the first World War a number of legislative proposals were offered 
in Congress to secure design protection under the copyright laws. Over 
thirty measures attempting to create some better sort of design pro-
tection were considered by Congress in a 20-year period, but none were 
passed.156 While the primary struggle over these bills centered in the 
dress design industry, the provisions were often not limited to the 
garment and textile area; for example, the best known of these pro-
posals, the Vestal Bill,157 inclqded every 
" ... pattern ... , shape or form of a manufactured prod-
uct . . . , dies, molds, or devices by which such ·a pattern, shape 
or form, may be produced, original in its application to or embodi-
ment in such manufactured product . . . and which produces an 
artistic or ornamental effect or decoration, but shall not include 
patterns or shapes or forms which have merely a functional or 
h "al " mec amc purpose. 
This bill, which based protection on a copyright analogy, passed the 
House in 1930 but died in the Senate, and thereafter violent differences 
of opinion in industry itself caused enthusiasm for the legislation to 
wane.158 Unless the confusion caused by the Stein cases stimulates 
renewed congressional interest in the problem, therefore, it does not 
seem reasonable to expect that legislation will fare more favorably at 
this later date. The possibility should not be dismissed, however.159 
Assuming that legislation will not be forthcoming the courts will 
154 See 7 J. PAT. OFF". Soc. 540 (1925). 
155 A further possible solution is the proposal that the copyright statute be amended 
expressly to provide that incorporation of the copyrighted work of art into utilitarian wares 
shall neither avoid the copyright nor exonerate the infringer. Kegan and Kipnis, "Protect-
ing Commercial Applications of Art," 2 DECALOGUE J. 5 (1951), digested 2 L. REv. Tue. 
9 (1951). 
156 Enumeration of these bills and general treatment of this area appears in W eikart, 
"Design Piracy," 19 hm. L.J. 235 (1944). See also 31 CoL. L. REv. 477 (1931); 
GOTsHAL AND LmF, THE PIRATES WILL GET You 1 (1945). 
157 H. R. 7243, 71st Cong., 2d sess. (1930). Coverage was cut down by a Senate 
Committee to five specific categories. Weikart, "Design Piracy," 19 hm. L.J. 235 at 249-
250 (1944). 
158 Weikart, supra note 157. During recent years of international tension, when 
sellers were in the economic saddle, the urgency of design protection diminished. With a 
return to a more normal economy, piracy may again become a fighting issue. 
159 For example, the Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law Section of the American 
Bar Association has been interested in the problem, legislation dealing with the specific 
problem of industrial design havin_g been recommended by the section in its 1950 Report. 
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have to continue their attempts to draw the boundaries. Possibly, of 
course, the whole question will be solved shortly by the Supreme 
Court.160 Until such time as the highest tribunal considers the matter 
on the merits, however, the question remains an open one. 
One or two additional comments might be made with respect to 
judicial determinations invalidating copyrights in this area. When the 
ground for decision is that the copyright statute is not intended to cover 
articles of practical use, the court apparently overlooks the point that 
many of the classifications of section 5 other than "works of art" 
expressly protect articles utilitarian in purpose. Directories, maps, and 
plastic works of a scientific nature are but three examples specifically 
named in the statute. Thus the statute does not appear to discriminate 
against "writings" which offer a collateral usefulness. Also ~pparently 
overlooked in the decisions is section 3 of the Copyright Code, which 
protects "all the copyrightable component parts of the work copy-
righted"; a fair reading of this language would warrant an interpretation 
that the artistic aspects of a work should be entitled to protection despite 
the presence of additional utilitarian fe~tures. 
A point worthy of re-emphasis is that despite the furor raised in the 
Stein cases over the presence of utilitarian features, there is nothing in 
either statute (copyright or design patent) making even collateral 
reference to utility. Although traditional modes of thought lump 
patents with usefulness, and copyrights with purely intellectual cre-
ativeness, the language of the design patent statute covers "designs for 
articles of manufacture" and the Copyright Code specifies "works of 
art," as the statutes stand today. The difference does not lie in 
utility.161 Differentiating the two are "manufacture" and "art," not 
necessarily exclusive opposites. Deliberate deletion of the term "use-
ful" by the Design Patent Act of 1902 indicates congressional intention 
to discard utility (otlier than that achieved by ornamentation) as a 
characteristic of the design patent.162 Perhaps the problem can be 
160 Review by the Supreme Court in the Stein controversy is likely because of the 
importance of the question and the existence of a conllict in the circuits. Supreme Court 
Rule 38(5)(b). [See note 107 supra-Ed.] 
161 Nor does the difference depend upon whether the article is commercialized: "Cer-
tainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial quality 
attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use-if use means to increase trade and 
to help make money." Holmes, J., in Bleist~in v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239 at 251, 23 S.Ct. 298 (1903). Accord, Rosenthal v. Stein, (9th Cir. 1953) 98 
U.S.P.Q. 180. 
162 As pointed out in a letter from the Commissioner of Patents sponsoring this legis-
lation, elimination of "useful" was motivated by the Patent Office's dissatisfaction with the 
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assessed with greater clarity if language of past opinions is temporarily 
put aside, and resort is had to the cold language of the two statutes. No 
hint of "utility" will then appear. Nor will any reason be apparent 
why a designer may not produce "works of art" deserving of "manu-
facture," without concern as to whether functional utility is present. 
Numerous decisions support the principle that "Utility plays no 
part in determining the validity of a design patent,"163 an approach 
which accords with the legislative history of design patent legislation.164 
This is not merely a matter of semantics; there seems to be at best an 
unfortunate inconsistency if artists seeking copyright protection are 
referred to the design patent laws on the ground that their works have 
utilitarian features, when design patent principles expressly reject utility 
as a criterion. Acknowledgment of this situation, of course, must be 
accompanied by recognition that generally "articles of manufacture" 
do serve utilitarian functions. Still, the objective of design patent 
protection is to beautify articles of commerce, not to siphon away from 
copyright protection all artistic works which happen to be useful. The 
concept of utility, which properly controls in mechanical patent cases 
because of express statutory language,165 should be irrelevant in cases 
such as the Stein litigation; it should not be permitted to obscure the 
plain existence of a borderland in the territory of appearance protection. 
If the statutes remain in the status quo, the courts have several 
alternative approaches to the problem of which protection is applicable. 
Reliance upon utility as a dividing instrument seems unsupportable, 
especially if it is coupled with the intention test expounded in the 
practice whereby inventors who could not meet the requirements established for mechanical 
patents applied instead under the design patent provisions. S. Rep. I 139, 57th Cong., 1st 
sess. (1902). 
163 Koch Mfg. Co. v. Blue Star Auto Stores, (7th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 598 at 599. 
See also, e.g., In re Toumier, 17 App. D.C. 481 (1901); Hueter v. Compco Corp., (7th 
Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 416. The view of the Patent Office is in harmony: " ..• The 
design patent protects only the appearance of an article, and not its structural or utilitarian 
features." GENERAL lNFonMATION CONCERNING PATENTS, Department of Commerce 24 
(1953). 
164 "It is thought that if the present bill shall become a law the subject of design 
patents will occupy its proper philosophical position in the field of intellectual production, 
having upon the one side of it the statute providing protection to mechanical constructions 
possessing utility of mechanical function, and upon the other side the copyright law, 
whereby objects of art are protected, reserving to itself the position of protecting objects of 
new and artistic quality pertaining, however, to ·commerce, but not justifying their existence 
upon functional utility. If the design,patent does not occupy this position there is no other 
well-defined position for it to take." Letter of Commissioner of Patents to (Senate) Com-
mittee on Patents, S. Rep. 1139, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 3 (1902). 
165 66 Stat. L. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C.A. (1952 Supp.) §101. 
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Expert case, which seems to have little relation to the real purpose for 
protection and which has been found unworkable in the English 
system.166 One writer has suggested the possibility of classifying useful 
works of art according to the degree to which the appearance of the 
article adheres to its function, copyright protection being granted to 
Stein-type articles since they depart so widely from the simple func-
tional requirements of a lamp; or, the idea of using as a standard the 
degree of objectivity available in determining whether an "improve-
ment'' in appearance has been brought about, design patent protection 
being appropriate where this degree of objectivity is high.167 Simpler 
and more in accord with the apparent legislative purpose, which does 
not appear to be predicated on a mutually exclusive conception of the 
two statutes, is the principle that each type of protection is to be judged 
upon its own merits, without regard to possible benefits, often impos-
sible of practical enjoyment, under the other statute. While a certain 
distrust of monopolistic potentialities would perhaps restrain the courts 
from ever permitting concurrent protection under both laws,168 it is 
submitted that the election theory worked out in the earlier cases fulfills 
the objectives of proprietor and public alike. To the argument that the 
question of election does not even arise, because the article is deter-
mined to be, for example, uncopyrightable in the first instance, the 
answer is that under current modes of thought the theoretical avail-
ability of the alternative protection is probably a material factor in 
reaching an adverse determination. It seems clear that Congress, 
whether consciously or not, whether wisely or not, has created an area 
of overlap; adjudications disregarding this phenomenon serve to warp 
166 The intention test may prejudice an artist who, at the time of his creation, is unsure 
as to how he will attempt to capitalize on his product. The probability is that he will 
exploit the work in the manner most desired by the public. 
167 Note, "Protecting the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility: Copyright or Design 
Patent?" 66 HARv. L. RBv. 877 at 884-885 (1953); the author of that note does not 
subscribe to these criteria. 
168 As a matter of logic, it does not seem objectionable to allow both types of protection 
on different aspects of the same article. 21 GEO. WAsH. L. RBv. 353 at 366 (1953). Both 
design and mechanical patent protection are occasionally granted to cover different aspects 
of a device of pleasing design and mechanical inventiveness. Boyle v. Rousso, (8th Cir. 
1926) 16 F. (2d) 666, and cases cited in SHOEMAKER, PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 21 (1929). 
In England double protection may exist. Werner Motors Ltd. v. A. W. Gambage Ltd., 
[1904] 1 Ch. 264; and see note 136 supra. A faint mention of possible double protection 
appeared in the court's opinion in Korzybski v. Underwood, (2d Cir. 1~29) 36 F. (2d) 
727 at 728-729, quoting from WEIL, COPYRIGHT LAw 85 (1917). However, as a practical 
matter, the traditional reluctance of the courts, in adjudications in the public law field, to 
extend unduly exclusive rights to individuals, should not be regarded lightly, whether or 
not this is thought of as an unwarranted monopoly phobia. 
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legislative intention rather than to draw clean lines of distinction. The 
fundamental responsibility for remedying the situation lies with the 
legislature. But in the absence of legislative surveying, it is to be hoped 
that works of art which qualify as designs for articles of manufacture 
will not be denied protection simply because they fall within a statutory 
borderland. Their dual nature should speak for them, or, at least, not 
against them. 
